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Resumo
Esse artigo analisa o impacto das interações sociais desenvolvidas por
imigrantes no comércio bilateral das regiões francesas. Utiliza-se dados
da distribuição dos imigrantes nas 95 microrregiões francesas (“départe-
ment” em francês) em cinco anos para a implementação de uma medida
direta do impacto das interações sociais na economia. Comparações di-
retas confirmam que essa medida é mais completa e robusta do que as
medidas usadas na literatura de comércio internacional.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of social interactions with immi-
grants on bilateral trade in French regions. Applying data on the distribu-
tion of immigrants in 95 French counties (“départment” in French) during
5 years, a measure of formation of networks is proposed and its impact is
tested on international trade, providing a direct measure of the impact of
social interactions on the economy. Direct comparisons confirm this mea-
sure as more complete and robust than measures used in international
trade literature.
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1 Introduction
Social networks provide a major explanation for the impact immigrants have
on international trade.1 This mechanism relies on two fundamental concepts.
Firstly, immigrant communities have the potential to deter violations of infor-
mal contracts. Secondly, immigrants benefit from privileged information on
home-country and host-country markets.
These interactions are better understood if one considers that newly ar-
rived immigrants benefit from a settled compatriot’s community, since they
face barriers of language, habits and culture. Work, loans, associates and re-
lationships can be found in such community. Specifically, business opportu-
nities can rise in this context, since market information from both home and
host countries is available within the community.
Rauch (1999) points out to the importance for proximity on network con-
tacts. Herander & Saavedra (2005) verify if proximity matters for interactions
between community’s members residing in the same host country. By analyz-
ing exports in American states, they found that both local immigrants (those
living in the exporting state) and nonlocal immigrants (those living in other
states) have an impact on exports. Nonetheless, local populations of immi-
grants have stronger impact on state exports than do nonlocal immigrants,
indicating that network effects decrease with distance.
The nature of those interactions, depending in the proximity, is observed
in the geographical concentration of foreigners, compared to natives (Bartel
1989). Such interdependence factors are reflected in the distribution of peo-
ple. Immigrants have a tendency to cluster at higher densities relative to local
population. Figure 1 shows the overconcentration of immigrants in France, in
comparison with the French population as a whole: 70% of the foreign pop-
ulation2 more concentrated than the French population. While there may be
specific reasons for that locally, in the region, they do not provide a complete
explanation for the overconcentration of immigrants.
This paper investigates the effect between social interactions of immigrants
on international trade. Considering the international trade in a certain French
region (with a given country), a network’s functional form is proposed by
counting all immigrants (from this given country) living in France, but taking
into account that these effects are a decreasing function of the distance. For
instance, it is assumed that a Portuguese in Lyon can contribute to the trade
between Portugal and Paris, even if to a lesser extent than could a Portuguese
in Paris.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and
the variables used. Section 3 reports on the findings before some tentative
conclusions are drawn in section 4.
1See Rauch (2001) and Wagner et al. (2002) for a synthesis of literature on the impact of
immigration on trade
2The foreigner population in France have a coefficient of geographical concentration G=0.24.
This positive concentration coefficient equals 0 if foreigners are distributed exactly the same as
the total population. Chiswick et al. (2002): “Where the overseas born group has a distribution
across regions the same as the total population, G equal to 0. Where the overseas born group is
completely segregated, the upper bound of G will equal (100-GS), where GS is the percent of the
total population accounted for by the specific birthplace group.”
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This graph compares the total population of foreigners in France to the total French
population. Data is from the 1999 census. Eg: 8% of all the foreigners living in France
resided in Paris (coded 75) compared to only 3% of the French population, in this year
Figure 1: Foreigners share versus French share, by French ”département”
2 Data and Variables Conception
The migration data used herein derives from the 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990 and
1999 French census. These provide information on the stock of immigrants
living in each of the 95 French metropolitan “départements” in those particu-
lar years. Total French populations are obtained from Insee (Institut National
de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques).3
Figures 1, 2 and 3 detail, in order, the spatial distribution of the total pop-
ulation in each French “département”, the total population of immigrants,
immigrants from Portugal, Morocco, Algeria, Italy, Spain, Germany, United
Kingdom, and Senegal.4
Focusing on economic factors, two types of behavior may be expected from
immigrants. Typically, they may target places with intense economic activities
and, in that case, present a distribution similar to the whole population in the
country; or they may form a population cluster in richer places. However,
several other factors can determine the distribution of these immigrants, such
as historical factors, amenities and proximity to home country. For example,
Spanish immigrants settle closer to Spain, as do Italians to Italy. German
people settle close to Alsace and Lorraine, following historical ties. These
evaluations are clear cut in the econometric analysis.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice that immigrants present very un-
even distribution not only when compared to the total population but also
between immigrant populations themselves. On the one hand, regions with
3French institute of statistics. Source: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.
asp?ref_id=NATnon02145&reg_id=0
4These nationalities were chosen for their historical bonds and significant presence in France.
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(a) All Immigrants - 1968 (b) All Immigrants - 1999
3 921 240 people 5 617 193 people
(c) Portugal - 1968 (d) Portugal - 1999
313 372 people 788 737 people
(e) Morocco - 1968 (f) Morocco - 1999
96 728 people 725782 people
Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Immigrants in France - All Immi-
grants, Portugal and Morocco
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(a) Algeria - 1968 (b) Algeria - 1999
473 812 people 685 558 people
(c) Italy - 1968 (d) Italy - 1999
1 049 620 people 573 161 people
(e) Spain - 1968 (f)Spain - 1999
843 436 people 435 828 people
Figure 3: Geographical Distribution of Immigrants in France - Algeria, Italy
and Spain
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(a) Germany - 1968 (b) Germany - 1999
107 960 people 435 738 people
(c) United Kingdom - 1968 (d) United Kingdom - 1999
27 956 people 93 459 people
(e) Senegal - 1968 (f) Senegal - 1999
6 472 people 59 301 people
Figure 4: Geographical Distribution of Immigrants in France - Germany,
United Kingdom and Senegal
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intensive economic activities or rich regions seem to be preferred. On the
other hand, immigrants seem to agglomerate and the first enclaves appear,
over time, to determine the compatriots’ location in a very robust way, even
in areas that do not present economic attractiveness.
Themaps in figures 1, 2 and 3 provide graphic evidence of the over-concen-
tration phenomenon approached in the introduction and addressed by the
literature (Chiswick & Miller 2004, Chiswick et al. 2002, Funkhouser 2000,
Gonzalez 1998, Carrington et al. 1996). Immigrants do not pursue exclusively
economic opportunities, as they also form communities.
For example immigrants from Senegal settled mainly in Paris and in the
Seine-Maritime (North West of Paris) in 1968. Thirty-one years later other
communities were formed, but those two agglomerations gave origin to a large
network of compatriots. It is impressive how many new immigrants are set-
tled in this region when we compare to all other distributions.
Data on French trade on regional level is available5 from the French Min-
istry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Town and Country
Planning.6 The data is available online for a restricted sample of countries
from 2003 to 2004. Namely, these countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The year 2004
is chosen for this study as it is close to the year 1999, which is the last year that
migration data is available for France and it is also a more complete dataset
compared to 2003.
Geographical variables such as “common border” (a dummy variable set
to 1 for pairs of countries that share a border) and “common language” (dum-
mies equal to one if both partners share a language) are extracted from the
CEPII database.7
The data on Gross Domestic Product and national population are taken
from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”.
3 Results
The potential social interaction of an individual of nationality k living in re-
gion i can be defined by:
Ski = ln
 J∑
j
skj
dij
 (1)
where:
dij is the distance between region i and region j, and I assume dij=1,
sj is the share of immigrants of nationality k living in region j .
For the sake of clarity time subscripts are omitted. This section combines
trade data (available on regional level) and immigration data (available on
“department” level); therefore geographic location is referred to by the word
“region”, responding to either a French “département” or region.
5http://www.statistiques.equipement.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?
id_rubrique=402
6Ministère de I’Écologie, de l’Energie, du Développement durable et de l’Aménagement du
territoire
7http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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This social component is based on the actual share of resident compatri-
ots in French regions at a specific point in time. Assuming the inverse rela-
tionship between distance and social interaction, each region’s share of im-
migrants in France is counted in this variable weighting the inverse of the
distance between the trading region and the region where he or she lives. Im-
migrants living the trading region are weighted by distance equals to one. The
choice to use the inverted distance follows the same functional form of many
applications in economics that decreases with the distance, such as the market
potential.
The estimate gravity equation of trade between country k and French re-
gion i is:
ln(T radekt) = α0 +α1S
k
i +α2ln(distki ) +α3FEk +α4FEi (2)
where
distkj is the distance between country k and French region i
FE are fixed effects for country k and French region i
Table 1 reports results from a trade analysis. These regressions follow the
last advancements in trade literature. The Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likeli-
hood estimator is applied (Santos Silva & Tenreyro 2006, Anderson & Win-
coop 2003) and specific country and region effects are controlled by fixed ef-
fects. Exports and imports are regressed separately.
Regression (1) and (2) estimates the impact of the Compatriot’s Network
on exports and imports, respectively. In these regressions, the distance shows
an expected coefficient (Disdier & Head 2008). The immigrants’ network
presents a positive impact on trade. Its coefficient is significant at 1% sig-
nificance level. The impact of migration on imports is higher than the impact
on exports. An increase by 10% in the national stock of immigrants raises
exports by 6.7% and imports by 11.2%.
Literature does not converge in this qualitative result. While Head & Ries
(1998) and Wagner et al. (2002) find a more important impact of migration
on imports than on exports, Gould (1994) and Girma & Yu (2002) find the
opposite.8
Two explanations are commonly presented for higher effects of migration
on imports. Firstly, immigrants may prefer consuming products from their
home country (Head & Ries 1998), thus, besides the network effect (impact-
ing both flows), this “preference” effect would only impact imports. Yet, it is
assumed the network effect is both symmetric for imports and exports.9
Secondly, imports and exports are composed differently, according to the
degree of differentiation of goods (Rauch & Trindade 2002, Tai 2009) and the
effect of networks is sensitive to this variation. Yet, this bias can be inverted
and also justify higher effects of migration on exports than on imports.10
A third explanation can be added to this study. A firm can somehow cen-
tralize its imports in a given county in France and then redistribute them to
other counties. In this case the network variable would also capture direct
8See Tai (2009), pp 228-229 for a discussion of these different results.
9For supporting higher effects of migration on imports through preference channel, the im-
pact of networks may also be smaller to imports than to exports.
10A definitive test for differences in the composition of imports and exports requires data
on trade disaggregation on sector level, which existence cannot be proved, to the best of my
knowledge.
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consumption. In the three cases above, results can be upward biased for im-
port regressions, and a measuring cannot be provided for the bias influence.
Nonetheless, the effect of migration is also very significant on exports, which
provides evidence of the existence of the network effect on trade.
Regressions (3) and (4) apply the instrumental variable method. They cor-
rect for a potential endogeneity between trade flows and migration. The bias
is already mitigated by the use of Immigrant’s stock instead of flows. How-
ever, the instrumental variable with lag of 8 years can offer a more accurate
result. Coefficients are positive and significant at the 99% confidence level.
Magnitudes rarely change and the coefficient for imports remains higher than
the coefficient for exports. A 10% growth in the national stock of immigrants
increases exports by 8.5% and imports by 16.6%.
Regressions (5) to (10) provide a comparison to other studies on the im-
pact of migration on trade. Regressions (5) to (8) introduce the quantity of
compatriots living in the reference region. It is exactly the approach typically
used in this kind of literature: the total quantity of immigrants living in a
country determines the bilateral trade of the country. From this estimation it
is clear that this kind of procedure is missing a key part. In columns (5) and
(6) the stock of migrants presents a non-significant coefficient when the Com-
patriot’s Network is controlled. This means the network variable incorporates
more information than the stock variable. Regressions (7) and (8) do not con-
trol the Compatriot’s Network. Even in this case, coefficients are smaller than
the network ones.
Regressions (9) and (10) apply the quantity of compatriots living in regions
that share a common border. This approach is very close to that of Herander
& Saavedra (2005).11 It is possible to see this variable is only significant to
imports at a 5% significance level. In contrast, the Compatriot’s Network vari-
able remains significant at 1% significance level for exports and imports. Yet
again, the method for counting immigrants’ network proposed in this study
seems to give better explanation of the impact of these networks on trade.
3.1 Discussion
These results seem to confirm the strength of social interdependences and the
existence of interactions even at distance. If new immigrants counted on set-
tled compatriots’ community for their installation in a host country, then net-
works would also have an impact on the location of foreigners. The remainder
of this subsection corroborates this effect.
A first issue in the empirical analysis is the control of agglomeration forces
other than social interactions. For example, Paris is a very centralizing city in
France, as confirmed by many studies cited in section 2. Exogenous economic
factors or some amenities could explain the massive concentration of immi-
grants in this region. The control featured herein considers origin country
fixed effects interacting with years of fixed effect.
Discrete choices as those of immigrants for any French region are fre-
quently estimated with a multinomial logit estimator. Instead, this work
agrees with Guimarães et al. (2003), which shows that the Poisson estimator
11Unlike Herander & Saavedra (2005) all out-of-region immigrants were not considered, but
only border sharing immigrants, otherwise variability in that would be extremely low in cross-
section data.
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provides the same coefficient and log-likelihood of multinomial logit, avoid-
ing problems with non-linearity.
Then the estimate equation is:
qtij = exp
β1 J∑
j,r
ln
qt−1irdjr
+ β2ln(distanceij) +Ωjt +Ωit +Mills + cte
 (3)
where:
qtij is the quantity of immigrants from country i settling in French “départ-
ment” j in time t,∑J
j,r ln
 qt−1irdjr
 is the sum of settled immigrants in the previous period, weighted
by the inverse of the distance (excluding those living in region j),
distanceij is the distance between country i and French “départment” j ,
Ωjt and Ωit are fixed effects for region-time and country-time.
This section uses only immigration data (available at “departément” level),
therefore geographic location is referred to by the word “département”.
While country of origin i may be any country in the world, estinations
“département” j are all restricted to one country, in this case France. This
implies a selection bias since each immigrant who had chosen region j had
previously chosen France as a destination country. This bias is corrected by a
probit estimator. The variable Mills is the inverse of the Mills ratio which has
been estimated from the first stage probit12 estimator, following the Heckman
(1979) method.
The compatriot’s network is hypothesized to capture the structure that res-
ident immigrants can offer to a new one, such as assistance with bureaucracy,
language, housing, employment and business opportunities, access to home
produce and leisure. This phenomenon can operate at a distance from one
region to another, assuming that the new location is either deemed to be more
attractive or less saturated.
Regression (1) verifies the positive impact of the Compatriot’s Network on
the immigrant’s location. Even controlling for all specific geographic effects
over time, the quantity and the proximity of pre-existing people from the
same nationality determine the distribution of immigrants. This sort of ag-
glomeration offers benefits to communication, housing, job and business pos-
sibilities, access to home produce, and leisure. These effects were analyzed by
some recent studies (eg. Chiswick & Miller 2004), pointing to the evidence of
a more intense concentration of immigrants, in contrast to concentration of
the national population.
Regression (2) introduces country-“département” fixed effects. This method
controls for all effects that are specific to each pairing of a country and “dé-
partement”. Geographical fixed effects are not interacted with time fixed ef-
fects in this regression because of technical limitation. The coefficient of the
network measures the impact within each geographical pair considering just
12The selection variable is the distance between the countries of origin and France. Other
independent variables of the first step probit are: the log of origin GDP, the log of origin popu-
lation, dummies for common border, common language and colonial links and fixed effects for
“départements” and time.
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Table 2: Choice of Location by Immigrants
Regression 1 2 3
Ln Compatriot’s Network 1.17∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.28∗∗∗
(−0.03)
0.27∗∗∗
(−0.08)
Ln Distance − 0.88∗∗∗
(−0.13)
−0.56∗∗∗
(−0.07)
Nonselection Hazard 0.35
(3.05)
− 0.46∗∗∗
(0.11)
− 7.35∗∗
(3.43)
Country, “département”, year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Country and “département” inter-
acted with year F.E.
Yes No No
Country-region F.E. No Yes No
Observations 39805 30292 29165
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
the time variation of the network variable. If the quantity of resident immi-
grants of a given nationality, living close to a reference “département”, raise
by 10% each year, or if the same quantity concentrates 39.8 km each year (if
each immigrant moves 39.8 km closer to the reference “département”), the
quantity of immigrants living in the reference “département” raises by 2.8% .
Regression (3) corrects for endogeneity13 applying lagged14 variables for
networks with two steps IV method. This regression includes the 16 years
lagged variable, which is in fact 24 years lagged to the dependent variable.
This period of time is more than enough to control endogeneity, as discussed
in the appendix. The coefficient is smaller than before, though still positive
and significant.
Taking column (5), a 10% increase in the network close to a reference “dé-
partement” implies an increase by 2.7% in the stock of immigrants of this “dé-
partement”. These regressions confirm the existence of social interactions of
migrants above any specific effect or endogeneity. Immigrants count on com-
patriots’ network when deciding a location in the host country. This natural
choice implies economic consequences, since the network assistance includes
not only help in the moving process, but also business and job developments.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the extent to which social interactions impact inter-
national trade, applying data from French census distinguishing immigrants
by their nationality, on the “département” level (95 “départements”), for five
years.15
These interactions provide business opportunities that are verified by a
very significant impact of networks on international trade. Trade of a certain
region is determined not only by the social interactions of immigrants within
the region, but also by the social interactions of the whole network of immi-
grants living in the country. This network measuring is more robust than the
measuring drawn from previous research.
13See the appendix to details about the instrumental variable.
14Because data are provided by 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990 and 1990 census, one lag represents 8
years in average.
15These data are aggregated by regions (21 regions) to correspond to trade data.
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A function for the role of the distance on social interactions is presented
and empirical outputs show that such interactions diminish following the in-
verse of the distance between two immigrants. Therefore, an immigrant bene-
fits from the compatriot’s network in the destination region and also from the
network installed in other regions of the country.
Results also show that the choice of location by an immigrant depends
heavily on the residing network from which he or she can benefit, even when
destination region, origin country, and time specific factors are controlled.
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Appendix A A Description of the Instrumental Variables for
determining immigrants’ location
There are two main problems concerning endogeneity. The first one is due to
the use of "stocks of immigrants" as a dependent variable. As Figure 4 shows,
part of this stock (square in gray) is already present at period t. Thus, the
network variable based on the stocks of neighbor “départements” at t has a
reverse causality relationship with the dependent vector. This would lead to
over-estimated coefficients for the network variable. Such endogeneity is cor-
rected by the instrumental variable method with the two lags of the network
variable. This corresponds to 16 years16 and, based on the data, there is no in-
tersection between the stock of immigrants at t+1 and the stock of immigrants
at t − 2.17
The second issue is that the network variable does not take into account
the stock of immigrants for the reference “départements”. In Figure 4, the
network variable does not sum the immigrants living in Paris at the period
t, which could cause an over-estimation by a missing agent. However, since
the reverse causality is controlled for, this effect captures the impact of im-
migrants living in the reference “départements” at period t who do not live
there at the next period (white square below grey square). Instead, these im-
migrants are part of the resident network and should thus be counted. This
second issue allows an improvement of the estimation as it partially considers
the network within the region.
Another downside related to endogeneity derives from not considering
explanatory variables that may have a significant effect. However, this is mit-
igated by using origin and destination fixed effects, which can be interacted
with time fixed effects.
16Migration data is obtained from the French census of 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990 and 1999. Each
lagged variable corresponds to 8 years difference on average.
17This conclusion is made based on data from the Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques,
from France (http://www.ined.fr/): The sum of immigration flows from 1999 to 2005 is 119
422, the respective difference in the stocks is 652906. Of the total population of immigrants in
2005 (4 959 000) 31.98% were not in France in 1999. On average, each year from 1999 to 2005 6%
of the population is composed of new immigrants (immigrants who arrived in the current year).
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Figure A.1: Endogeneity and the Stock of Immigrants
